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Background: Avian H5N1 influenza viruses present a challenge in the laboratory environment, as they are difficult
to collect from the air due to their small size and relatively low concentration. In an effort to generate effective
methods of H5N1 air removal and ensure the safety of laboratory personnel, this study was designed to investigate
the characteristics of aerosolized H5N1 produced by laboratory manipulations during research studies.
Results: Normal laboratory procedures used to process the influenza virus were carried out independently and the
amount of virus polluting the on-site atmosphere was measured. In particular, zootomy, grinding, centrifugation,
pipetting, magnetic stirring, egg inoculation, and experimental zoogenetic infection were performed. In addition,
common accidents associated with each process were simulated, including breaking glass containers, syringe
injection of influenza virus solution, and rupturing of centrifuge tubes. A micro-cluster sampling ambient air
pollution collection device was used to collect air samples. The collected viruses were tested for activity by
measuring their ability to induce hemagglutination with chicken red blood cells and to propagate in chicken
embryos after direct inoculation, the latter being detected by reverse-transcription PCR and HA test. The results
showed that the air samples from the normal centrifugal group and the negative-control group were negative,
while all other groups were positive for H5N1.
Conclusions: Our findings suggest that there are numerous sources of aerosols in laboratory operations involving
H5N1. Thus, laboratory personnel should be aware of the exposure risk that accompanies routine procedures
involved in H5N1 processing and take proactive measures to prevent accidental infection and decrease the risk of
virus aerosol leakage beyond the laboratory.
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The pandemic H1N1 outbreak of 2009 and global threat
of H5N1 in recent years have been accompanied by a
large amount of laboratory-based experimental research
activity using purified viruses and infected tissues and
animals. The majority of these studies have focused on
either natural infections from the community or induced
infections in the laboratory, with very few studies consid-
ering the infection risk or outcome of laboratory
personnel handling the samples. The potential of an acci-
dental laboratory-acquired infection is well-recognized* Correspondence: jldxnxb@yahoo.com.cn; zipxia@126.com
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reproduction in any medium, provided the oramong laboratory staff and researchers. In 1941, Meyer
and Eddie published the first report of laboratory infec-
tions due to the Gram-negative bacteria Brucella [1]. In
1949, Sulkin and Pike published a report that summarized
222 laboratory-acquired infections due to viruses [2]. Since
then, significant efforts have been made by the oversight
committees of research institutes and governmental bodies
to establish occupational and environmental safety guide-
lines to protect workers and the local community alike
from laboratory-acquired infections; however, these infec-
tions have yet to be eradicated and many have been
reported over the past eight decades [3-9].
The total number and relative frequency of bacterial
laboratory-acquired infections has, in fact, declined dra-
matically over time [10-12]. In contrast, the relative fre-
quency of viral laboratory-acquired infections has
increased by 60% [13]. Research into the underlyinghis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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that the main route of infection, for both bacteria and
viruses [9,14-20], is through mucous membranes that are
contaminated by inhaling pathogens, not dissimilar from
the natural route of infection [21]. Traditionally, the risk
of laboratory infection has been minimized by simply
practicing good laboratory practice (GLP), which is
otherwise necessary for reliability of the laboratory work
itself. A detailed examination of the publically available
information on all reported laboratory-acquired infec-
tions, however, indicated that ~80% were not the result
of overt "accidents"; it is, thus, likely that inhalation of
aerosolized infectious particles that are liberated by nor-
mal laboratory techniques account for a large portion of
laboratory-acquired infections.
Research into this theory has indicated that influenza
virus transmission and infection can be achieved through
aerosols [22]. Many of the routine procedures used to
process influenza virus for laboratory research, such as
centrifugation or mixing, have a high potential of produ-
cing aerosols [21], and the particle load of each has been
estimated to be up to 1–5 μm. In addition, it is expected
that larger particles will tend to fall out of the air and
contaminate surfaces, by which individuals may be
infected by contact or may transmit the particles to a
secondary aerosol [4]. Fundamentally, aerosols are sus-
pensions in the air of solid or liquid particles small
enough that they will remain transmissible and airborne
for a prolonged period of time [23]. Particles of 5 μm or
less increase the risk of establishing an infection upon
airborne transmission, as they are remarkably capable of
penetrating the physical cellular barrier of the respiratory
tract and traveling all the way to the alveolar region. As
with naturally-acquired infections, most individuals are
not diagnosed before onset of symptoms, impeding the
time to initiation of treatment [24].
The A type influenza viruses are commonly spread by
the airborne route in normal circumstances. Accordingly,
more research on the potential and character of aerosol
spread of influenza virus has been carried out [25-27], andFigure 1 Micro-cluster sampling ambient air pollution collection devic
Andersen (a). The device relies on the liquid impactor approach to capture
into the sampler. Blue, thick arrows represent airflow out of the sampler (c)many studies have used experimental animal models of
aerosol infection to mimic the natural process [19,28,29].
However, less information is available on the features of
laboratory-produced aerosolized influenza virus.
The Australian researcher, Adrian Gibbs, suggested
that the A/H1N1 flu virus currently circulating around
the world was created in a laboratory. Although the
World Health Organization (WHO) eventually dismissed
this theory, suspicion and panic were aroused in the gen-
eral public about laboratory safety. There are many situa-
tions that may facilitate the spread of a pathogen from
the laboratory, ranging from aerosols produced by rou-
tine procedures or misuse of laboratory equipment to
uncontrollable natural disasters that impact the struc-
tural integrity of the laboratory, such as earthquake or
fire. In order to regulate the potential of pathogen trans-
mission from the laboratory, we must first gain a detailed
understanding of the experimental operations that pro-
duce aerosols. To this end, this study was designed to
monitor the presence of aerosolized H5N1 virus pro-
duced by normal procedures used to process the virus
for experimental research and by the most frequently
associated “accidents” for each, such as container break-
age and accidental subcutaneous injection. This informa-
tion will help to guide future experimental practice
standards to ensure the safety of laboratories and labora-
tory personnel, thereby increasing community confi-
dence in laboratory bio-safety.
Results
Experimental application of the aerosol collection device
The prototype sampling device, shown in Figure 1, con-
sisted of a controller and six pumps with AGI-30 or
Andersen impingers of a wireless networking technology.
This instrument can collect several samples of aerosols
simultaneously, or can be set to have one of the six
pumps operate independently. We used liquid impingers,
which rely on inertial collection mechanisms to collect
aerosolized particles [30] and were situated as described
in the Materials and Methods. The sampler outlet wase. The device consists of a controller and six pumps with AGI-30 or
airborne viruses (b). Red, thin lines and arrows represent the airflow
. The cartoon is a simplified representation.
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turn in flow streamlines at the nozzle outlet, just above
the liquid surface. Particles with high inertia cannot fol-
low sharp turns in streamlines and will impact and pene-
trate the liquid surface after exiting the nozzle.
Result of normal operation of laboratory procedures
At the start of each group experiment, the sampler was
operated for 30 minutes to obtain baseline readings of
the laboratory atmosphere. Collection of aerosols from
the seven groups of experimental procedures and con-
trols followed the steps detailed in the Materials and
Methods section. The processing time was 30 min for
each group, except for group I (time was 1 h), and the
air sampling distance was 38 cm from the working mate-
rials. Statistics of the group temperature and relative hu-
midity for each of the data collection processes,
including operations and control of the collection, were
measured automatically by the aerosol collector.
None of the aerosol samples collected from any group
at the time directly prior to processing of the experiment
had detectable levels of H5N1, as evidenced by negative
reverse transcription (Rt)-PCR and HA text results. All
liquid aerosols collected from the experimental proced-
ure of group III were also negative for H5N1 (Table 1,
Figure 2). The aerosols collected during the experimental
procedures of all other six groups were positive for
H5N1. The aerosols from each group taken after disin-
fection were negative (Table 2).
Result of laboratory procedures operation with simulated
accidents
Our experiment was carried out in a negative pressure
isolation unit with mechanical arm (Figure 3).
The three groups of procedures with simulated acci-
dents (broken glass containers with influenza virus sus-
pension, syringe-ejected influenza virus suspension, and
centrifuge tube rupture) all produced aerosols. The con-
trols for each were all negative. All of the aerosols that
were produced contained H5N1 that was detectable by
Rt-PCR and HA text (Table 1, Figure 4).
Discussion
The field of laboratory-acquired viral infections has pro-
gressed since Sulkin and Pike’s seminal report in 1949
[2], but the problem has yet to be completely eliminated.
The paucity of experimental data is an important reason
for this. Our study, presented herein, provides the firstTable 1 HA text detection of H5N1 in aerosols generated




HA Text 25 25 27 27 28evidence of laboratory procedures that generate viral
contamination that can potentially infect laboratory
personnel.
In fact, all of the studies performed to date by others
to determine whether laboratory studies of pathogens,
including viruses, bacteria and fungi, could generate in-
fective aerosols have been based on statistical analysis of
actual infections. The influenza viruses present a particu-
lar challenge to monitoring in the lab by traditional
methods, since their small size and low concentration
make them difficult to collect and detect from the air.
Most of the bioaerosol samplers currently on the market
are not suitable for collection of viruses [31]. Further-
more, effective detectors need to be able to conveniently
collect air samples at various time points over the course
of an entire experiment since virus-containing aerosols
may be generated by any number of steps in the process
and then fall from the air prior to an end-of-procedure
sampling time point. The currently available samplers
typically run for short periods of time (minutes), making
it difficult to capture large volumes or integrate sample
collection over time. We designed a collector terminal
with six air pollution sampling probes that are able to
continuously sample the air for ≥10 h; in addition, this
device is portable and can be easily moved around the la-
boratory to locales where different steps of the experi-
ment are performed. The feature of remote control
allows for simultaneous or sequential collection in differ-
ent locales from two or more of the probes. In the study
described herein, to test the capability of such a detector,
the aerosols collected during the experiment reflected
the virus produced in most operations; this study was
not designed to clearly delineate a complete picture of all
potential applications of this device.
Measuring infectious virus from air samples is logistic-
ally difficult. Few researchers have reported airborne in-
fluenza virus from the laboratory, and even fewer have
detected the infectious capacity of influenza viruses
sampled from air. Traditional methods of determining
the presence of virus in an aerosol include directly apply-
ing the concentrated aerosol to infect a host cell, or as
template in Rt-PCR to detect virus-specific genes. One of
the most commonly used methods is Rt-PCR because of
its remarkable sensitivity and specificity; however, Rt-
PCR is unable to determine whether the detected virus is
infectious. In our study, we combined experimental
approaches that would determine both the concentration








29 29 210 210
Figure 2 Result of Rt-PCR for aerosol samples from each group. Lanes: 1, marker; 2, zootomy group; 3, grinding group; 4, pipetting group; 5,
magnetic stirring group; 6, egg inoculation; 7, experimental zoogenetic infection group; 8, centrifugal group; 9, control group.
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of influenza virus, we were able to estimate the concen-
tration of influenza virus in aerosols according to the
amount of adsorption that occurred with red blood cells
(RBCs). By also using the aerosols to directly inoculate
chick embryos, we were able to determine the ability of
the aerosolized virus to proliferate in vivo, indicating the
infectivity of the contaminating pathogens. Future stud-
ies will aim to determine the feasibility of this approach
for quantifying virus in the aerosol.
This study, to our knowledge, represents the first
successful attempt to directly detect influenza virus-
containing aerosols generated by routine laboratory
procedures. Our results provide evidence that many of
the laboratory techniques used to process influenza virus
for experimental analysis produce aerosols and, thereby,
represent significant risks of infection to laboratory
personnel and potential spread beyond the laboratory.
Working in the laboratory is inevitably dangerous, but
nearly all risks can be sufficiently minimized by GLP and
careful monitoring of risk factors, such as presence of
pathogen-containing aerosols. According to the results
of this study, we plan to extend our investigations to
emergency operating procedures that follow laboratory







Collection time, h 1 0.5 0.5
Temperature,°C 29.5 ± 3.6 30.6 ± 1.7 28.1
Relative humidity,% 28.0 ± 5.1 22.8 ± 2.2 25.6
Positive experimental samples, n/total 6/6 6/6 0/3
Positive of control samples, n/total 0/6 0/6 0/3effective strategies to prevent laboratory-generated aero-
sols and laboratory-acquired infections or spread.
Conclusions
In summary, our findings demonstrated that many of the
laboratory techniques used to process influenza virus
produce aerosols, either through normal operations or
common accidents associated with each process. Our
results have great value and implications towards bio-
safety and future strategies to evaluate risks of experi-




Purified avian influenza virus (A/chicken/Jilin/9/2004
(H5N1), GenBank: AY653193~AY653200) was obtained
from our laboratory stock, and diluted 10-1 in phosphate
buffered saline (PBS, 0.1 mol/L) supplemented with free
calcium and magnesium. Aliquots of this stock solution
were stored at −80°C until use. Prior to experimentation,
virus was propagated by infection in chicken eggs, and
yield was determined to be 6.7 log10 50% egg infection
doses per milliliter (EID50/mL). All the experiments














0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
± 1.0 25.2 ± 1.9 28.0 ± 2.1 30.8 ± 0.9 30.9 ± 1.9
±1.3 30.5 ± 3.3 26.1 ± 3.2 22.3 ± 1.3 21.9 ± 2.4
3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3
0/3 0/3 0/3 0/3
Figure 3 Modified negative pressure isolation unit with a mechanical arm. Modified negative pressure isolation unit with a mechanical arm
to carry out controlled ‘accident’ procedures generating virus-carrying aerosols.
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University, First Hospital of Jilin University and Academy
of Military Medical Sciences, in accordance with guide-
lines of the Nation Health and Medical Research Council
of China.Aerosol collection
Aerosol collection was carried out with the micro-cluster
sampling device that was designed by the Academy of
Military Medical Sciences (Beijing, China). Airborne
biological particles were gathered using liquid impin-
gers (All Glass Impinger 30, AGI30; ACE Glass Inc.,
Vineland, NJ, USA) that rely on inertial collection
mechanisms. The flow rate was 12.5 Lmin-1, when the
pressure drop across the orifice was 41 cm Hg. The tip of
the capillary stem was situated 30 mm from the flask bot-
tom; therefore, when filled with 20 mL of liquid, the nozzle
outlet was 10 mm above the resting liquid surface.Figure 4 Rt-PCR analysis of the procedures operation with
simulated accidents. Lanes: 1, broken glass container group; 2,
syringe-ejected influenza virus suspension group; 3, tube rupture
group.Airborne biological particles drawn into the 1 mm diam-
eter nozzle and down the capillary stem, then impacted
and penetrated the liquid surface [32]. The adhesion
properties involving liquid and airborne particles were
exploited by this technology to capture the microor-
ganisms [33].Simulation experiment
Biosecurity level
All assays were conducted in a Biosafety Level 3 setting.
The containment laboratory – Biosafety Level 3 – was
designed for work with Risk Group 3 microorganisms in
large volumes and Risk Group 2 microorganisms at high
concentrations. In addition, the Biosafety Level 3 con-
tainment laboratory was equipped with a negative pres-
sure isolation unit, which was used in our study for
simulating accidents during laboratory procedures.Normal operation of laboratory procedures
Normal laboratory procedures were carried out under
controlled conditions for the purpose of monitoring the
amount and character of aerosol produced. In group I
(zootomy), chickens diagnosed with AIV upon autopsy
were sectioned and the excised tissues frozen at −20°C.
The total collection time was 1 h. Disinfection of the
anatomical units after collection and air sampling took
an additional 1 h. Control air samples were taken in the
same units one day later. This process was repeated a
total of six times, and six chickens were necropsied. In
group II (grinding), the frozen lung tissues were thawed,
ground in a mortar, and transferred to a centrifuge tube
for storage at 4°C. Aerosol collections were carried out
during grinding (at 20 min into the procedure) and
10 min after the homogenate was collected, for a total of
30 min. After disinfection of the area, air samples were
immediately collected. This entire process was repeated
six times. In group III (centrifugation) the tissue homo-
genates were centrifuged at 5000 rpm for 20 min at 4°C.
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handling of the centrifuge tube to the centrifuge to the
end of the spin when the centrifuge instrument was
opened and the tube removed. To balance the centrifuge
for each spin, the six homogenates were processed in
groups of two, so that the experiment was repeated three
times. Air sampling was performed after disinfection for
use as the control. Collection times were 30 min. In
group IV (pipetting), the supernatant resulting from the
centrifugation step was transferred by a pipettor to a
new tube, using blow-out and pull-in processes a total of
10 times to mix each sample. To ensure continuity of
the experimental integrity, the pipetting experiment was
carried out in another similar laboratory room that did
not communicate with the centrifuge room. The same
air sampling procedure was carried out for 30 min dur-
ing the experiment and after disinfection. Similar to
group III, the procedures of group IV were repeated
three times. In group V (magnetic stirring), the virus-
containing supernatant samples were diluted with PBS
(pH 7.2) in a 10-fold series. This occurred by taking
1 mL of supernatant and adding to PBS in a 9 mL beaker
with a stir bar that was placed on an active magnetic stir-
rer. Air sampling occurred throughout the entire process
and after disinfection of the space, three times at 30 min
each. In group VI (egg inoculation), 10 chick embryos
(about 9-days-old) were inoculated with 0.2 mL diluted
virus sample (10-fold diluted virus stock solution) per
embryo. Air samples were collected throughout the
process, including the time when the virus was drawn
into the syringe, air bubbles were removed from the syr-
inge, chick embryos were injected, and sealing wax was
applied. A total of 10 chicken embryos were inoculated
in each air monitoring experiment. Air samples were col-
lected throughout and after disinfection, taking 30 min.
The procedure was repeated three times, requiring a
total of 30 chick embryos to be inoculated. In group VII
(zoogenetic infection), five chickens (7-days-old) was
intranasally administered virus at a dose of 0.2 mL per
chicken. The zoogenetic infection experiments were
repeated three times. Air sampling was carried out at
intervals of 30 min each, and after disinfection.
Laboratory procedures with simulated accidents
Laboratory simulation of accidents that most frequently
occur during the routine processing of influenza viruses
were carried out inside a negative pressure isolation unit
equipped with a simple robotic arm and operating
gloves. In accident group I (broken glass containers),
glass containers holding influenza virus suspensions were
dropped in a free-fall and the broken pieces collected as
in a routine clean-up procedure. In accident group II
(syringe-ejected influenza virus suspension), 3 mL of the
virus dilution (10-fold diluted virus stock solution) wasdrawn into a disposable syringe, and the plunger was
depressed to spray out a small amount of the virus sus-
pension into the air. In accident group III (centrifuge
tube rupture), empty microcentrifuge tubes were centri-
fuged at inappropriate speeds to produce cracked tubes.
Then, 1 mL of virus solution was added to the tube and
the tube was closed and manually squeezed until the
tube ruptured and the liquid splashed out, at which point
air samples were collected. All of the processes for the
three groups were repeated five times. For each, air sam-
ples were collected before the procedure for use as the
control. The collection time was 30 min.
Detection
After virus propagation in chicken eggs, the allantoic
fluid was collected and processed according to standard
procedures for detections of AIV by Rt-PCR and HA
text, both detections were repeated twice. The sensitivity
of the Rt-PCR procedure to detect AIV was evaluated by
using a 10-fold diluted virus series; AIV was detectable
by this method up to 10 [13] dilution of the virus solu-
tion (Figure 5).
Treatment of liquid impingement samplers
The processing of samples collected by the air monitor
was based on well-known hemagglutination properties of
H5N1 [34]. Briefly, the virus in each sample would bind
to RBCs, causing an agglutination effect that was propor-
tional to the virus concentration. In addition, the sam-
ples were used to inoculate 9-day-old embrocated
chicken eggs. Eggs were incubated for 72 h at 37°C and
then chilled overnight at 4°C. The allantoic fluid from
each egg was collected separately and detected by stand-
ard Rt-PCR. For long-term storage, chicken RBCs
(CRBCs) were treated with formaldehyde.
Treatment of erythrocytes. Chicken blood was divided
into several tubes and centrifuged at 3000 rpm for
10 min; the resultant supernatant was carefully removed
by pipetting and mixed with sterile PBS (pH 7.2). Three
PBS washing steps by centrifugation were carried out. Fi-
nally, the erythrocyte sediment was diluted with PBS at a
1:20 (vol/vol) ratio and 2.5% glutaraldehyde was added at
a 4:1 (vol/vol) ratio and the solution was oscillated at
room temperature for 45 min. The treated erythrocytes
were washed four times with PBS by centrifuging
(3000 rpm for 5 min each), and finally resuspended in
PBS at 2% (treated erythrocytes/ volume of PBS) and
stored at 4°C until use.
Treatment of sample. Samples collected from experi-
mental groups and their respective controls were incu-
bated on ice to chill. Then, treated erythrocytes were
added at a 1:2.5 (vol/vol) ratio. Adsorption was allowed
to proceed for 1 h at 4°C, during which time the sample
was intermittently mixed by inverting the tubes several
Figure 5 Rt-PCR analyses of virus adsorb-proliferation sensitivity. Lanes: 1 negative; 2 DNA markers 3–16 Rt-PCR results of 10-fold diluted
series of virus solution.
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5000 rpm for 10 min at 4°C, and the supernatant was
discarded. The sediment was resuspended with 1 mL
PBS on ice and recentrifuged at 5000 rpm for 10 min at
4°C, after which the supernatant was discarded. The
sediment was then resuspended in a mixture of 0.1 mL
amb-antibacterial media (supplemented with penicillin
and streptomycin, 100 U/mL each) and 0.1 mL PBS.
The mixture was incubated for 1 h at 37°C with inter-
mittent mixing by inverting the tubes several times. The
entire volume (0.2 mL) of each sample was then used
to inoculate a 9-day-old embryonated chicken egg. The
inoculated eggs were incubated for 72 h at 37°C and
then chilled overnight at 4°C. The allantoic fluid from
each egg was collected, except in the cases where the
embryo had died within 24 h after inoculation.Reverse-transcription PCR and HA text
A standard Rt-PCR test was performed to confirm the
presence of the virus in allantoic fluid. A total of 0.2 mL
of the allantoic fluid was used for RNA extraction by the
Qiagen RNeasy Mini Kit (Cat No. 75182) and then ap-
plied to a reaction mix using reagents from the one-step
Rt-PCR amplification Mini Kit (Qiagen Cat No. 210212),
as follows: initial heating step, 95°C for 15 min; reverse
transcription, 55°C for 30 min; initial PCR activation
step, 95°C for 15 min; 35 cycles of amplification (de-
naturation, 94°C for 1 min; annealing, 60°C for 1 min;
extension, 72°C for 1 min); final extension, 72°C. Gene-
specific primers for the NP gene of H5N1 were: NP-For-
ward, 5′-GCATTGTCTCCGAAGAAATAAG-3′ and
NP-Reverse, 5′-CAGATACT GGGCHATAAGRAC-3′.
The expected length of the amplicon was 320 bp.
The allantoic fluid (positive by Rt-PCR) was detectable
by hemagglutination test that performed to confirm the
presence of the virus. Hemagglutination test was per-
formed in 96-wells microtiter plates with 1% CRBCs.Abbreviations
Rt-PCR: Reverse-transcript polymerase chain reaction; HA: Hemagglutination;
GLP: Good laboratory practice; WHO: World Health Organization; AGI30: All
Glass Impinger 30; CRBC: Chicken red blood cell.
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